Mobile IP has recently undergone some interesting transformations in order to be more suitable for use by existing cellular telephone operators and equipment manufacturers. Originally engineered as a solution for wireless LANs, Mobile IP enables a wireless network node to move freely from one point of connection to the Internet to another, without disrupting TCP end-to-end connectivity. New protocol functions for authentication, authorization, and accounting are being designed to enable service providers to make a business case for supplying Mobile IP to their mobile customers.
obile IP has recently undergone some interesting transformations in order to be more suitable for use by existing cellular telephone operators and equipment manufacturers. Originally engineered as a solution for wireless LANs, Mobile IP enables a wireless network node to move freely from one point of connection to the Internet to another, without disrupting TCP end-to-end connectivity. IP without Mobile IP can only route packets to an IP address at one place, not allowing for mobile networking.
Mobile IP solves this problem for wireless LANs and in many other scenarios, especially with applications for which the agents offering local connectivity to the mobile node do not have to verify its identity. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Mobile IP working group viewed connectivity almost as a basic electronic event, and charging for connectivity about as important as charging for the light from a lightbulb. And, in fact, someone does have to pay for the electricity, but it's not a matter of constant concern. The working group allowed for, but did not design, verification protocols to check the mobile node's identity in the absence of a preconfigured security association.
To extend Mobile IP for use by cellular telephone companies, some additional mechanisms are needed by which the agent at the point of connection on the foreign domain (the foreign agent) can verify the identify of the mobile node, and also authorize connectivity based on local policy or ability to pay. The extensions to Mobile IP, currently under consideration for standardization within the IETF, rely on the existence of servers that are capable of performing accounting, authentication, and authorization (AAA) services. This new infrastructure is designed to meet the emerging needs of cellular telephony [1] for mobile data service to a large population of mobile telephone users, and eventually voice over IP.
Mobile IP will increase the deployment of wireless data applications. The AAA extensions under construction will create a more acceptable path toward ubiquitous availability of wireless service across the domain boundaries of the operators for many different wireless access services. This, in turn, may enable convergence between wired and wireless protocols for internetworking, and provide further impetus for the convergence between voice and data networks.
From Dialup Service to Mobile Networking
Today, customers obtain Internet services by negotiating a point of attachment to a home domain, generally from an Internet service provider (ISP) or some other organization which fulfills service requests. With the increasing popularity of mobile devices, a need has been generated to allow users to attach to any domain convenient to their current location. That is, a client often needs access to resources provided by an administrative domain other than their home domain (i.e., a foreign domain). Service providers in a foreign domain commonly require authorization to ensure a good business relationship with the client. This leads directly to authentication, and of course accounting (whence AAA); these three AAA functions are closely interdependent. An agent in a foreign domain, called on to provide access to a resource by a mobile user, is likely to ask the customer to provide credentials which can be authenticated before access to resources is permitted. The desired result may be as simple as a conduit to the Internet, or as complex as access to specific private resources within the foreign domain. Credentials can be exchanged in many different ways, the specifics of which are not important here. Once the credentials are authenticated, the mobile user may be authorized to access services within the foreign domain. An accounting of the actual resources used can be assembled (e.g., in a call detail record).
The formal description of Mobile IP can be found in [2] . The possibility of extending Mobile IP to move between domains which require AAA services has created an immediate demand to design and specify compatible AAA protocols. Once available, the AAA protocols and infrastructure will provide the economic incentive for wide-ranging deployment of Mobile IP. It is our purpose here to identify, describe, and discuss the functional and performance requirements for Mobile IP in the areas of authentication, authorization, and accounting. Some of this material is adapted from a recent Internet draft under consideration by the AAA working group [3] .
We also motivate and outline some basic extensions to Mobile IP for making use of AAA services. After showing our basic AAA model, we describe requirements based on the general model, followed by requirements derived from specific Mobile IP protocol needs. In the future, other improvements (e.g., quality of service, QoS, and IPv6) are likely to extend the applicability of the AAA protocol to solve more customer requirements.
The Basic Model
Within the Internet, a client belonging to one administrative domain (the home domain) often needs to use resources provided by a foreign domain. An agent in the foreign domain that attends to the client's request (called the attendant) is likely to require that the client provide some credentials which can be authenticated before access to the resources is permitted.
The attendant may not have direct access to the data that is needed to complete the transaction. Instead, the attendant is expected to consult a local authority in the same foreign domain in order to obtain proof that the client has acceptable credentials.
Since the attendant and the local authority are part of the same administrative domain, they are expected to have security relationships that enable them to securely transact information locally. The local authority in the foreign domain (AAAF) itself may not have enough information to verify the credentials of the client. Nevertheless, in contrast to the agent attending the client, AAAF is expected to be configured to be able to negotiate the verification of client credentials with an external authority (e.g., AAAH). The local and external authorities are configured with sufficient security relationships and access control so that they (possibly without the need for any other agents) can negotiate the authorization which enables the client to have access to the requested resources. This authorization commonly depends on secure authentication of the client's credentials.
Once the authorization has been obtained by the local authority, and the authority has notified the attendant of the successful negotiation, the attendant can provide the requested resources to the client.
As an example in today's Internet, we can cite the deployment of RADIUS [4] to allow mobile computer clients to have access to the Internet by way of a local ISP. The ISP wants to make sure that the mobile client can pay for the connection. Once the client has provided credentials (e.g., identification, reply protection, and an unforgeable signature), the ISP checks with the client's home authority to verify the signature and obtain assurance that the client will pay for the connection. The replay protection data used for authorization at one attendant are unusable in future negotiations at the same or any other attendant. For dialup, the attendant function can be carried out by the network access server (NAS), and the local and home authorities can use RADIUS servers.
In Fig. 1 , there might be many attendants for each AAAF, and for each attendant there might be many clients from many different home domains. Each home domain provides an AAAH that can check credentials originating from clients administered by that home domain.
There is a security model implicit in Fig. 1 , and it is crucial to identify the specific security associations assumed in that security model, as illustrated in Fig. 2 .
First, it is natural to assume that the customer has a security association SA 1 with the AAAH, since this is roughly what it means for the customer to belong to the home domain. This changes the security model of Mobile IP, because the design in RFC 2002 assumes that the mobile node has a security association with the home agent, which is a routing agent and not an authorization agent. This is a significant difference.
Second, given the configuration shown in Fig. 1 . it is clear that AAAF and AAAH have to share a security association SA 3 , because otherwise they could not rely on the authentication results, authorizations, or even the accounting data which might be transacted between them. Nodes in two separate administrative domains (e.g., AAAH and AAAF) must take steps to verify the identity of their communication partners, and possibly to guarantee the privacy of the data making up the communication.
As mentioned previously, the attendant can naturally share a security association SA 4 with AAAF. This is necessary in order for the model to work because the attendant has to know that it is permissible to allocate the local resources to the customer. Finally, in order to minimize the configuration burden on the mobile node, we suggest that the home agent share a security association SA 2 with the AAAH. As described later, this allows the mobile node to maintain only a single security association SA 1 (in particular, that with AAAH) and no others. For Mobile IP, the attendant is the foreign agent (FA). The AAAH is responsible for preparing the home agent (HA) to handle Mobile IP registration traffic from a mobile node (MN), shown as a laptop in the picure.
From the description and figure, we can identify several requirements:
• Each local attendant has to have a security relationship with the local AAA server (AAAF).
• The local authority has to share security relationships with external authorities that are able to validate customer credentials.
• The attendant has to keep state for pending customer requests while the local authority contacts the appropriate external authority.
• Since the mobile node is not likely to get service until its credentials are checked, it has to be able to provide complete yet unforgeable credentials without the prior need to interact with its home domain.
• The attendant has to protect against replay attacks.
• Since the MN's credentials have to remain unforgeable, intervening nodes (e.g., the attendant or AAAF) must never learn any (secret) information which might compromise the credentials. Besides the above, experience with today's ISPs indicates: • There are scenarios in which an attendant will have to manage requests for many customers at the same time.
• The attendant equipment should be as inexpensive as possible, since it will be replicated as many times as possible in the foreign domain in order to handle as many customers as possible. Many modern IP nodes are programmed to receive some IP-specific resources during the initialization phase of their attempt to connect to the Internet. AAA services must be able to obtain a suitable IP address for the client. This requires identifying the client by some means other than its IP address. The network access identifier (NAI) [5, 6] is expected to be used as the necessary identifier for clients who do not already have an IP address.
The form of the NAI (user@realm) allows the local AAA server (AAAF) to easily determine the home domain (realm) for the client. Thus, the AAAF can locate an appropriate home domain from which to request authorization for the client. The home AAA server, given the user ID, can locate security information needed for validation of the credentials presented by the mobile user, identified as user@realm. Thus, the NAI is well suited for use in the general AAA model illustrated in Fig. 1 . If the MN is a cellular telephone identified by its IMSI, that identification may be supplied within an NAI. As with other dynamic address allocation schemes, it will become more difficult in this scheme to identify the MN by its Domain Name Service (DNS) name During subsequent registrations and smooth handoffs, we want to avoid interactions between the MN or mobility agents and the AAA servers as much as possible. Given the simple initial trust relationships illustrated in Fig. 2 , this means that the AAA servers have to be able to perform some key distribution during the initial Mobile IP registration process from any particular administrative domain. We expect that AAAH will create one key for use between the MN and the HA, another key for use between the MN and the FA, and a third key for use between the FA and the HA. These are the three keys that will be used for the appropriate mobility authentication extensions applied to future Mobile IP registrations.
The lifetime of any security associations distributed by the AAA server for use with Mobile IP should be long enough to avoid too-frequent initiation of AAA key distribution, since each invocation of this process is likely to cause lengthy delays between registrations. Registration delays in Mobile IP cause dropped packets and noticeable disruptions in service [2] . The lifetime of the key between the MN and the HA can just as well determine the length of time before the MN has to initiate a new key distribution from the AAA servers.
Enhancements
The basic model outlined above is being extended in various ways to improve its scalability, applicability, and compatibility with other deployment models. Foremost among the scalability enhancements is the introduction of a brokered model for arbitrating authorizations between two administrative domains. Instead of requiring that the foreign domain keep current security associations with each possible home domain, we expect instead that centralized intermediate agents called brokers will develop security associations with a large number of administrative domains. Then the brokers will be able to securely pass AAA data between the domains, and each domain's AAA servers may be able to operate by maintaining only a single security association, namely, that with the broker. On the other hand, brokers are likely to increase registration latencies.
Since the MN may acquire a dynamically assigned IP address, we may also dynamically assign an HA to the MN. This would further reduce the amount of preconfiguration information needed by the MN, and may even afford the facility to locate the HA closer to the current location of the MN.
In the near future, we also expect that AAA servers will be employed to authorize requests for special QoS handling for MNs. The exact same interconnection topology will serve to handle such requests, although the specific fields of the control messages necessary may change significantly. We believe that this effort can beneficially wait until statically configured QoS protocols are more widely understood in the Internet, but that time is fast approaching.
Lastly, as soon as we have enough experience with the current round of AAA protocol design, we expect to immediately engage in an effort to apply our ideas for IPv6. This additional effort will also benefit from the ongoing efforts in IPv4 mobile networking and AAA. The major difference for IPv6 is that the natural repository for the attendant (the FA) is no longer part of the protocol model. Instead, the analogous attendant functionality will become associated with either IPv6 routers or stateful configuration services. We follow the philosophy that eventually most Internet devices will be mobile computers, so it is appropriate for routers to support functions that will be useful to that majority population.
Conclusion
We present a set of requirements for a new security architecture for Mobile IP, organized according to a progressively more detailed model of operation. The first requirements follow from the natural model for operation used in today's Internet, with special attention focused on the kinds of existing security associations that have evolved over the last few years. From that model, additional needs can be associated with the need for machine configuration and, in particular the dynamic allocation of an IP home address for a mobile client that wishes to use Mobile IP.
From the requirements and the natural trust model, a message flow has been engineered. With the proposals currently under consideration in the IETF a mobile node becomes tuly able to roam throughout the Internet, while on the other hand needing substantially less administrative attention. It only needs a password and an NAI to formulate its global passport.
With these mechanisms, Mobile IP is stepping into the forefront of recent efforts by cellular telephone companies to extend their service offerings around the world. This comes along with the possibility for major simplifications in telephone network protocols. If the existing Internet becomes integrated with telephone and mobile cellular infrastructures, Mobile IP may lead the way to economical communications anywhere in the world.
The interaction between Mobile IP entities and AAA services supplies the missing piece to enable operators to make a business case for offering Mobile IP wireless data to their customers. Adapting AAA to Mobile IPv6 opens the doors for end-to-end addressibility for billions of current and future wireless devices. Along with recent developments in localizing Mobile IP registration traffic and smooth handoffs, these are signposts along the road to the muchheralded convergence of voice and data communications, as well as that between fixed and wireless networking.
The AAA requirements and protocols described here are subject to change as time goes on. The author believes that they represent a very likely evolutionary path for mobile networking, but opinions do vary. For current information, please monitor the Mobile IP and AAA working groups of the IETF. For details about how to join the mailing lists, please consult the Web page, http://www.ietf.org, and follow the links to the working groups; Mobile IP is in the routing area, and AAA is in the operations area.
